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PRIOR RESTRAINT OF
EXPRESSION THROUGH THE
PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE
By EDWARD J. EBERLE*
B.A., Columbia University; 1978; J.D.,
Northwestern University, 1982.
Introduction
pRIVATE CITIZENS frequently discover the contents of dam-
aged or misdelivered packages belonging to others.' When.that
private discovery uncovers material which appears to be obscene,'
the conscientious private citizen normally contacts government au-
thorities. Police officials often use the fortuity of the private dis-
covery to re-inspect the contents of the privately seized container.'
* The author is grateful to Jane Stalker Eberle, who provided invaluable assistance,
guidance, and support in preparing this article.
1. There are many cases involving fortuitous private discoveries of property. Some con-
troversies arise from the detection of broken or damaged containers. See, e.g., United States
v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Entringer, 532 F.2d 634 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1976). Other situations involve at-
tempts by shipping agents to determine the identity of lost baggage or packages. See e.g.,
United States v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Haes, 551 F.2d 767
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). In still other
cases, suspicious shipping agents undertake searches of package contents. See, e.g. United
States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975).
2. In recent years the Court has experienced difficulty in formulating effective stan-
dards for determining whether particular expression is obscene. See infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text.
3. The "private search doctrine" involves the acquisition by police authorities of pri-
vate property that has been seized and searched by private citizens. The doctrine commonly
holds that searches of private property by private citizens are beyond the scope of the
fourth amendment. Courts frequently interpret the doctrine to hold that upon searching
materials, private citizens may transfer the property to police officials without tolling the
fourth amendment. For further discussion of the private search doctrine, see infra notes
128-38 and accompanying text.
Many courts have interpreted the private search doctrine as sanctioning any police
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After reviewing the package contents, should police authorities de-
termine that the seized materials are obscene, they frequently con-
fiscate the material without a warrant" and use it as evidence in a
criminal prosecution against the owner of the package.'
The transfer of presumptively protected "expressive mate-
rial" from private to official custody implicates both first and
fourth amendment interests. Because all expression is presump-
tively protected until determined otherwise, the first amendment
7
applies. The fourth amendments pertains because the seizure of
the expressive material by police authorities is designed to pre-
serve evidence for a criminal prosecution. Although both amend-
reinspection of contents of packages which were validly obtained from private parties, rea-
soning that a private party is simply relaying the fruits of his search to police authorities.
Employing fourth amendment analysis, these courts have reasoned that any subsequent po-
lice action does not constitute a separate search requiring a warrant. See, e.g., United States
v. McDaniel, 574 F.2d 1224, 1226-7 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.s. 952 (1979); United
States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 401 (D.c. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Entringer, 532 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1976). Police might leave
the package with the shipper for purposes of enacting a "controlled delivery." A "controlled
delivery" is a type of bait often used to lure dealers in contraband. Controlled deliveries
frequently occur after a carrier unexpectedly discovers contraband in the course of inspect-
ing luggage. Upon being contacted, law enforcement agents restore the contraband to its
container and authorize the carrier to deliver the container to its owner. When the owner
appears to take delivery, he or she is arrested. The practice has been upheld in United Staes
v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Haes, 551 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975);
United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2nd Cir. 1973).
Police might also take only a few copies of the material for purposes of getting a war-
rant to seize all the material. See United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc); United States v. Kelly, 529
F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1976). In either event, police have established control over the material.
5. See, e.g. United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Haes,
551 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Entringer, 532 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1976).
6. The teachings of the Supreme Court hold that all expression must be presumed con-
stitutionally protected until it has been judicially determined to be otherwise. See Roaden v.
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
7. The first amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
8. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be biolated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
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ments apply, most courts are hesitant to sustain first amendment
rights at the expense of police interests.9 Indeed, courts seeking to
protect only fourth amendment concerns may fail to vindicate first
amendment interests. Plainly, there is an uncertain and unresolved
relationship between the first and fourth amendments over the
handling of police receipts of expressive material procured through
private searches.
This article examines the first and fourth amendment inter-
ests that are implicated when government authorities take posses-
sion of privately seized, presumptively protected expressive mate-
rial and concludes that safeguards must be implemented to protect
the first amendment interests at stake. First, the article reviews
the recent Supreme Court case of Walter v. United States,10 that
considered, but did not resolve, the constitutional problems at is-
sue. Next, the discussion examines the first amendment values im-
plicated by government controls over expression and considers pro-
cedures developed by the Supreme Court to safeguard first
amendment rights in situtations not involving private searches.
The article then evaluates the fourth amendment ramifications of
private searches and subsequent government acquisitions of ex-
pressive material, arguing that because of its underlying rationale
and application, the fourth amendment is an inadequate vehicle
with which to safeguard first amendment values in these situa-
tions. The discussion demonstrates that government seizures of ex-
pressive material often result in prior restraints of expression. Fi-
nally, the article concludes by providing a model for the
satisfactory accommodation of freedom of expression, privacy, and
police interests.
I. WALTER V. UNITED STATES
Although some courts are sensitive to the first amendment val-
ues implicated by government receipts of presumptively protected
9. See, e.g. United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (fourth
amendment protections do not apply to books discovered by private parties since the books
were "voluntarily relinquished to the government [by private citizens.]"). Similar logic was
employed in United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Entr-
inger, 532 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967).
10. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
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expressive material," a disturbing number have shown little incli-
nation to sustain freedom of expression. These courts have instead
relied on the private search doctrine to sanction police seizures of
expressive material." Even where police seizures of expressive ma-
terial have ultimately been repudiated, many courts have predi-
cated their condemnation on fourth amendment principles.1 s
The Supreme Court in Walter v. United States considered,
but did little to resolve the lower courts' disparate treatment of
first amendment protection of expressive material seized through a
private search. Even though Walter involved the removal of 871
films from public circulation for at least sixteen months,1 4 the plu-
rality barely addressed the first amendment rights implicated in
the case, stating only that fourth amendment warrant require-
ments must be "scrupulously observed" when the object of the
search involves the first amendment.' 5 The plurality seems to have
assumed that fourth amendment protections would adequately
safeguard first amendment interests."
The plurality relied on fourth amendment principles to con-
demn police conduct and concluded that although the government
acquisition was proper, examining the film contents constituted a
"'significant expansion" of the search that had been conducted pre-
viously by a private party. That additional police action was there-
fore characterized as a separate search.17 Because the additional
government search was warrantless, it was invalid."
Discounting a government argument that the initial private
search had eliminated any expectation of privacy in the package
11. See, e.g., United States v. haes, 551 F.2d 767 (Sth Cir. 1977); United States v. Kelly,
529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1976).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Entringer, 532 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.c. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Haes, 551 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1977).
14. The F.B.I. held the films for two months before viewing all of them. The films were
then held for another two months before the U.S. District Attorney's office received them.
(This fact does not appear in the Supreme Court decision but is mentioned by the lower
court. See United States v. Sanders, 592 F.2d 788, 797 (5th Cir. 1979) (Wisdom, J., dissent-
ing)). At least one more year passed before the indictments were finally handed down. Id. at
797.
15. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 655 (1980).
16. Id. at 654-55.
17. Id. at 657 (the viewing of the films with a projector by F.B.I. agents constituted the
independent search).
18. Id.
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contents,19 the plurality determined that the conduct undertaken
by government authorities violated the owners' legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. 0 The government could not justify its reexamina-
tion of the materials by reason of the private parties' initial search,
the plurality reasoned, unless the government had an independent
ground upon which to search the packages."' In discussing the pri-
vate search, the plurality noted that the private party had not ac-
tually viewed the films.22 The plurality accordingly reserved judg-
ment on whether the government would have needed a warrant
had the private party been the first to view the films. 23
The lack of consensus in Walter reflects the.confusion in the
circuits regarding the treatment to be afforded official receipts of
privately searched expressive material." While recognizing that
such police seizures raised freedom of expression problems, 3 the
Court failed to apply effective first amendment safeguards. Thus it
remains possible for courts to employ the private search doctrine
as a vehicle for sanctioning seizures of presumptively protected ex-
pressive materials.'
19. Id. at 658-59.
20. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text for development of the individual
privacy interests that underlie the fourth amendment.
21. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1980).
22. Id. at 657 n.9.
23. Id. Though concurring in the judgment, Justice White took exception to the plural-
ity's suggestion that it was still an open question whether the government could screen the
film if the private party had previously done so. Id. at 660. Justice White reasoned that nay
government screening of the film would require a warrant to avoid violating the defendant's
privacy interests. Id.lr at 662. Concurring in the rest of the plurality's opinion, Justice
White agreed that the government validly acquired the films and could legitimately ex-
amine package contents exposed to plain view without obtaining a warrant. Id. at 661-62.
24. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
25. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 655-56 n.6 (1980).
26. Although the Walter case involved material on the borderline of obscenity, it is
possible that a Walter-type police seizure could easily implicate other forms of expression.
Alternative opinions on political matters or domestic or foreign policies might similarly be-
come entangled in the web of transfer from private to official hands. See, eig., New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (attempted government suppression of
"Pentagon Papers"). Any number of other forms of minority or dissenting expression might
also be affected. Though the Walter case states the matter at issue, the problem is hardly
confined to borderline obscenity.
The definition and meaning of "borderline" expression is considered infra notes 55-57
and accompanying text.
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A. Interests Protected By The First Amendment
The right to receive and transmit information and ideas, re-
gardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society
and forms a core value of the first amendment.27 By protecting the
right of individuals and groups to engage in expression secure from
the threat of government control, the first amendment safeguards
the integrity of individual ideas, beliefs, and opinions.28
While enhancing individual liberties, the first amendment
guarantee of free expression also promotes significant social inter-
ests.29 By protecting the public's right to the unrestricted circula-
tion of ideas and opinions,30 freedom of expression helps maintain
the balance between stability and change in society by providing a
vehicle for the exploration and testing of contrary ideas and view-
27. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969): "It is now well established that the
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas . . . .This right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, .... is fundamental to our free soci-
ety." Id. (citations omitted).
28. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717
(1961); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
29. A leading commentator, Professor Thomas Emerson, has outlined four broad cate-
gories of values that a system of freedom of expression encourages: (1) individual self-fulfill-
ment, (2) means to attain truth, (3) a method of securing participation by citizens in social
and political decision-making, and (4) a way of maintaining the balance between stability
and change in society. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970)
(hereinafter cited as T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION); Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 878-79 (1963) (hereinafter cited as
Emerson, First Amendment Theory). See also, Bloustein, The First Amendment and Pri-
vacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 41 43 (1974)
(essentially agrees with Emerson's four-value freedom of expression system); Fuchs, Further
Steps Toward a General Theory of Freedom of Expression, 18 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 347
(1976) (supports the Emersonian system). But see BeVier, The First Amendment and Polit-
ical Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299,
318-22 (1978) (rejects Emerson's premise that individual self-fulfillment is a first amend-
ment principle). See also Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982)
(argues that first amendment ultimately serves only one true value, indiviul self-realization,
which may be interpreted as realizain of human potential or control over one's life (destiny).
30. See, e.g., A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 213 (1964) (plurality) ("...
if seizure of books precedes an adversary determination of their obscenity, there is danger of
abridgement of the right of the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of nonob-
scene books."); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (city ordinance adversely im-
pacts on first amendment because "bookseller's burden would become the public's burden,
for by restricting him the public's access to reading matter would be restricted.").
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points."1 Because freedom of expression promotes an exchange of
viewpoints, citizens are readily informed of the prevailing currents
of thought in society.32 This ready access to information fosters an
open dialogue enabling all members of society to participate in the
resolution of important societal issues."
Values which appeal to minority groups, however, are often re-
jected by majority members of society. 4 Strong societal pressures
work to suppress unpopular ideas and values." Yet the first
amendment protects against the suppression of unpopular as well
as conventional opinions." Indeed, the first amendment is
31. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957): "The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of polit-
ical and social changes desired by the people." See also, W. GELLHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS 43
(1960) (freedom of expression tends to promote a more stable society); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (hereinafter cited as A. MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH); Emerson, First Amendment Theory, supra note 29, at 884-86.
32. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of
the first amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail . . ."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Cf.
DuVal, Free Communication and the Quest for Truth: Towards a Teleological Approach to
First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 188-94 (1972) (a brief review
and critique of the marketplace theory of first amendment expression, which stresses the
social value of free and open discussion as the best means of discovering and disseminating
truth).
33. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976): "[The Framers'] chief
concern was the need for freedom of expression in the political arena and the dialogue in
ideas." Cf. Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATION 39-43 (1947) (first amend-
ment guarantees that all ideas will at least be allowed to make an appeal to the intellect and
conscience of individuals; freedom of expression necessary for popular participation in polit-
ical process); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 31, at 48 ("freedom [of public dis-
cussion] is the basic postulate of a society which is governed by the votes of its citizens.");
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, in Free Speech and Association: The
Supreme Court and the First Amendment 1 (P. Kurland ed. 1975); Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 68 (1975) ("At the heart
of that system [of free expression] . . .is the guarantee of equal liberty of expression.").
34. See Z. CHAFER, supra note 33, at 39 (viewpoints unpopular because of their novelty
or confinement to minority groups); Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger
Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 425 (1980) ("Values that appeal to individual, rather than
social, interests are often less persuasive to majority elements in a society, particularly
where their implementation requires deference to the rights of minorities.").
35. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 649
(1955) (hereinafter cited as Emerson, Prior Restraint). Professor Emerson decries the "omi-
nous expansion of preventive law in the area of civil liberties," which, in part, he believes is
due to government efforts to control expression. Id.; see also, Karst, supra note 33, at 29-35.
36. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of U. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959).
"IT]his argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not
confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority .... And
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designed to promote an exchange of contrasting expressions, ideas,
and values.
Because the preservation of our system of liberty largely de-
pends on an informed and active public, 7 genuine freedom of ex-
pression is essential. Any restriction on expression tends to under-
mine the democratic process by abridging the public's access to
ideas."8
B. Prior Restraint Doctrine
The prior restraint doctrine is concerned with limiting govern-
ment control over expression and is fundamental to the protection
of freedom of expression. " The doctrine holds that official restric-
tions may not be imposed on expression in advance of publica-
tion.4 0 As observed by the Supreme Court, "a free society prefers
in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than which is uncon-
vincing." Id.; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957): "All ideas having
even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaran-
tees, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important in-
terests." Id. (citation omitted).
37. Justice Brandeis outlined the value of freedom of expression in informing the gen-
eral public and preserving our liberties in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 379 (1927)
(concurring opinion): "They [the Framers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth;
that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine. .... "
Id.; see also T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 29; DuVal, supra note 32, at
194-203; Fuchs, supra note 29.
38. Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note 35, at 658.
39. T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 29, at 503-12. Emerson provides a
concise description of the prior restraint doctrine and its historical development. See also
Emerson, Prior Restraint, supra note 35; Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12
HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 519, 520-22 (1977); Murphy, The Prior Restraint Doctrine in the
Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 898 (1976).
40. Blackstone observed:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of free state, but this
consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in freedom
from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freemen has an un-
doubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid
this is to destroy freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity
.... Thus the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that free
will is the object of legal punishment.
5 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151 (1965 ed.); see also T.
EuMsoN, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 29, at 503-04.
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to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand.' 41
While the prior restraint doctrine traditionally operated as a
check on state actions in the operation of censorship systems,'
more recent decisions of the Supreme Court have expanded the
notion of prior restraint to encompass official actions that curtail
expression without a judicial determination of illegitimacy. 8
Under this view any official removal of expressive material from
public circulation without a judicial determination of illegitimacy
may constitute a prior restraint.44
Because of the dangers to freedom of expression posed by
prior restraints, 5 the Supreme Court has vigilantly guarded
41. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (emphasis in
original).
42. See T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OP ExPRESSION, supra note 29, at 503-04.
43. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) ("restrictive order entered
to protect a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury" constitutes a prior restraint);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (denial of use of munici-
pal facilities for theater production constituted a prior restraint); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (administrative licensing scheme regarded as prior restraint).
44. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); see also Litwack, supra note 39, at
522 ("any government action that significantly curtails the dissemination of information and
ideas prior to an adequate determination that the materials are unprotected by the first
amendment is a prior restraint.").
45. Because prior restraints shut off expression before it transpires, they may suppress
a wider range of expression and are more easily accomplished than resorts to subsequent
punishment under the criminal process. T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN, supra note
29, at 506; Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STN. L. Rav. 539, 543 (1977) ("prior
restraint. . . excessively and unnecessarily stifling. . . [and] a more restrictive alternative
than subsequent punishment."). Unlike a system of subsequent punishment, prior restraints
do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal process. Thus, while resorts to the
criminal process assure reasoned scrutiny of expression through procedural safeguards a
prior restraint "has an immediate and irreversible sanction." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stu-
art, 427 U.S. 539, 559 81975). The Supreme Court has thus stated that if a criminal sanction
"chills' speech, [a] prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." Id. at 559.
Prior restraints pose further dangers to first amendment speech since they often oper-
ate under administrative systems which partially screen the actions of censors or censoring
bodies from general exposure. There is thus less opportunity for public appraisal and criti-
cism. Institutional forces inherent in such administrative systems have a propensity to re-
strain and suppress all expression without regard to the nature of particular ideas. Emerson,
Prior Restraint, supra note 35, at 657-70 ("The long history of prior restraint reveals over
and over again that the personal and institutional forces inherent in the system nearly al-
ways end in a stupid, unnecessary, and extreme suppression." Id. at 659). Equally danger-
ous, individuals and administrative bodies, who judge expression and determine whether
restrictions are warranted, generally lack adequate training or skill to make vital decisions
affecting expression.
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against the premature suppression of speech through prior re-
straints. In the landmark decision of Near v. Minnesota,46 the
Court stated, "it has been generally, if not universally, considered
that it is the chief purpose of the [first amendment] guaranty to
prevent previous restraints upon publication." '47 In affirming the
Near principle, the Court recently announced in Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart that "prior restraints on speech and publication are
the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights."48 Because of the threats they pose, prior re-
straints are presumptively unconstitutional and require a heavy
burden of justification to sustain validity."9
Despite this heavy presumption of constitutional infirmity,
prior restraints are not invalid per se.50 There are certain well-de-
46. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Near the Court struck down a state statute which provided
for the enjoining of publications which engaged in defamation, scandal, obscenity and mali-
ciousness. Reasoning that the statute amounted to "effective censorship," the Court held
that the statute constituted a prior restraint, and hence abridged freedom of press guaran-
tees. Id. at 712.
47. Id. at 713. The Court also stated: "The fact that for approximately one hundred
and fifty years there has been almost an entire absence of attempts to impose previous
restraints upon publications relating to the malfeasance of public officers is significant of the
deep-seated conviction that such restraints would violate constitutional rights." Id. at 718.
48. 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1975).
49.. "'Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity.'" New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
The Supreme Court has also stated that any system of prior restraint may be tolerated
only when it is operated under sensitive procedural safeguards. See Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). "We have tolerated such a system only where it operated
under judicial superintendence and assured an almost immediate judicial determination of
the validity of the restraint." Id. (citations omitted). For development of the procedural
safeguards employed by the Supreme Court to protect against the suppression of first
amendment speech in systems involving prior restraints, see infra notes 67-99 and accompa-
nying text.
50. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1957).
The phrase "prior restraint" is not a self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a
talismanic test. The duty of closer analysis and critical judgment in applying
the thought behind the phrase has thus been authoritatively put by one who
brings weighty learning to his support of constitutionally protected liberties:
"What is needed," writes Professor Paul Freund, "is a pragmatic assessment of
its operation in the particular circumstances. The generalization that prior re-
straint is particularly obnoxioux in civil liberties cases must yield to more par-
ticularistic analysis."
Id. (quoting Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 553, 539
(1951)).
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fined exceptions to the doctrine.5 ' In the absence of an exception,
however, the presumption of invalidity against prior restraints is
extremely difficult to overcome. "And even where this presumption
might otherwise be overcome, the Court has insisted upon careful
procedural provisions, designed to assure the fullest presentation
and consideration of the matter which the circumstances
permit. 52
C. The Chilling Effect Of Prior Restraints
Prior restraints generally operate without supervision and
tend to be indiscriminate; 8 therefore they often suppress wide
ranges of expression. Legitimate expression is frequently restricted
along with speech of a more questionable nature. In theory all
expression may be affected, however, prior restraints are especially
likely to curtail expression which lies on the border of legitimacy.55
51. The more commonly known exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine include war-
time exigencies and incitements to violence and the overthrow of the government. Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
Although the Court in Near stated that obscene publications were also an exception to
the prior restraint doctrine, the Court has since declined to develop the obscenity exception
as envisioned in Near. Id.; see, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (statutory
censorship system requiring prior submission of films may validly operate only under proce-
dural safeguards); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (Court upheld statute
regulating obscene publications, but emphasized Statutory safeguards and did not rely on
the prior restraint doctrine). Consequently, some commentators have postulated that the
prior restraint doctrine has only limited application in the obscenity area and that no blan-
ket exception exists for obscene matter. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
supra note 29, at 507-12.
52. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968).
53. See, e.g. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 723 (1961): "They seized all
magazines which '[i]n our judgment' were obscene; when an officer thought 'a magazine...
ought to be picked up' he seized all copies of it." Id. at 723.
52. As aptly stated by the Supreme Court, while reviewing restraints placed on the
musical production of "Hair," "The perils of prior restraint are well illustrated by this case,
where neither the Board nor the lower courts could have known precisely the extant of
nudity or simulated sex in the musical, or even that either would appear, before the play
was actually performed." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561
(1975); see also, Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 (1963) ("it should be noted
that the Attorney General of Rhode Island conceded in oral argument in this Court that the
books listed in the notices included several that were not obscene within this Court's defini-
tion of the term.").
55. Besides Walter, the tendency of prior restraints to suppress so-called "borderline"
expression is well illustrated by other Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Freedman v. Ma-
ryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (plurality);
Bantam Books Inc. v. Brown, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717
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Such borderline speech frequently involves minority expression
that may enhance individual and social values."' Thus the view-
points which may stimulate a free exchange of ideas are often the
most susceptible to suppression.
According to.the Supreme Court, the "line between speech un-
conditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be
regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn. . . .,6 In the
obscenity area, in fact, the Court itself has frequently been unable
to promulgate effective standards.8 The difficulties experienced by
the Supreme Court plainly illustrate the complexities involved in
determining the limits of protected expression. In view of these
complexities, the competence of police authorities to make deci-
sions affecting expression must seriously be questioned. 9
(1961).
"Borderline" expression is material which lies on the line between unconditional protec-
tion and speech which may be regulated constitutionally. See infra notes 57-58 and accom-
panying text.
56. A famous example of attempted suppression of what was then considered border-
line expression involves James Joyce's Ulysses. See United States v. One Book Entitled
"Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), affd 72 F.2d 705 (2nd Cir. 1934). For discussion
of Ulysses and related cases, and the change in the obscenity standard surrounding their
adjudication see T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN, supra note 29, at 468-70.
57. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.s. 513, 525 (1958).
58. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973):
Apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, no majority of the Court
has at any time been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes
obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the States' police
power .... We have seen 'a variety of views among the members of the Court
unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication.'
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Douglas stated rather bluntly that "The Court has worked
hard to define obscenity and concededly has failed." d. at 37 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 413 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
The question of whether obscenity should remain unprotected by the first amendment
is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate the
chilling effects current interpretations of the private search doctrine have on all protected
expression, not just arguably obscene matter.
59. Indeed, police authorities' or censoring bodies' lack of or failure to utilize adequate
and effective evaluative skills indeciding to place restrictions on expression has frequently
resulted in arbitrary, injudicious actions. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546 (1975) (city's attempted restraint of musical production "Hair"). For discus-
sion of Southeastern Promotions, Ltd, see supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (Court overturned determination of state board that
film Carnal Knowledge was obscene); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure" v. Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (Court reversed state court finding that book
"Fanny Hill" was obscene).
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Because police authorities lack the requisite evaluative skills,
they may effect serious, indiscriminate restraints on expression,
encompassing legitimate and illegitimate speech.60 Coupled with
the threat of criminal prosecution, any police conduct that inap-
propriately suppresses borderline expression constitutes a clear
disincentive to the exercise of first amendment rights." Indeed, in
the face of threatened criminal penalties, deprivations of licenses,
economic losses, or other sanctions, few citizens will avidly seek to
disseminate expressive materials. Such sanctions tend in fact to
promote self censorship among disseminators of these materials."
While all expression is threatened by the actions of zealous
police authorities, insensitive police conduct serves to chill minor-
ity expression especially, because the threat of punishment is
greatest where the dissemination of unpopular viewpoints is in-
volved. The whole process of arrest and pretrial confinement serves
as a strong disincentive to the dissemination of any expressive ma-
terial which approaches the borderline." Injudicious police con-
duct affects society as well as individuals, because the distribution
of borderline material decreases in proportion to the threat of
criminal prosecution. 64 Where distributors and other secondary
participants in the dissemination process refrain from first amend-
ment activities, public access to controversial ideas and opinions is
severely curtailed.68 Society is then deprived of the open dialogue
60. See, e.g. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1964), where police committed particu-
larly gross abuses. In Stanford police obtained a warrant to search defendant's home for
evidence of his affiliation with the Communist Party. Despite the stated purpose of the
warrant, police seized approximately 300 different books and pamphlets wholly unrelated to
communist activities. "[A]mong the books taken were works by such diverse writers as Karl
Marx, Jean Paul Sartre, Theodore Draper, Fidel Castro, Earl Browder, Pope John XXIII,
and (even) Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black." Id. at 479-80.
Police also took possession of defendant's "private documents and papers, including his
marriage certificate, his insurance policies, his household bills and receipts, and files of his
personal correspondence." Id. at 480. Ironically, "[tihe officers did not find any 'records of
the Communist Party' or any 'party lists and dues payments.'" Id.
61. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1967) "A criminal prosecution
under a statute regulating expression usually involves imponderables and contingencies that
themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms." Id. (citations omit-
ted). "The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the
fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure." Id. at 487.
62. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959).
63. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HAnv. L. REv. 518, 538 (1970).
64. See Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185, 189 (1968).
65. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), where the Court invalidated a
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necessary for the democratic process and social progress."'
D. First Amendment Procedural Safeguards
Recognizing that unbridled police discretion in searching and
seizing presumptively protected expressive materials can easily re-
sult in prior restraints,67 the Supreme Court has developed proce-
dural safeguards for the search and seizure of material protected
by the first amendment. Promulgated within the context of war-
rant-authorized police action and statutory censorship systems, the
protections require prompt judicial involvement to control the
handling and to determine the protected nature of the curtailed
expression. These procedures safeguard individual first amend-
ment rights and also serve to protect public rights in the un-
restricted circulation of expressive material that ultimately may
not be declared illegitimate. 6 As yet, the Court has not applied
these protections to private searches of expressive material. The
scope and limits of these protections are examined below.
1. The Requirement Of An Adversarial Hearing With Judicial
Determination
The requirement of an adversary proceeding followed by a ju-
dicial determination of first amendment content is a fundamental
protection and must accompany any curtailment of expression.6"
city ordinance which imposed strict liability on retail sellers of obscene materials because it
would discourage sellers from selling any potentially controversial books. In striking down
the ordinance the court reasoned that "the bookseller's burden would become the public's
burden, for by restricting him the public's access to reading matter would be restricted." Id.
at 153.
66. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
67. In Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), for example, the Court con-
cluded that a statutory seizure process was infirm in allowing warrants to be issued solely
upon conclusary police allegations of obscenity. The process was defective, the Court rea-
soned, because it permitted unguided police discretion in the search and seizure of expres-
sive materials. Without satisfactory statutory direction, the police were able to seize mate-
rial based on their own ad hoc determinations on the spot. "[T]here was no step in the
procedure before seizure designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity." Id. at
732.
68. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); A Quantity of
Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); see also Note, Prior Adversary Hearings on the Ques-
tion of Obscenity, 70 COLuM L. Rv. 1403 (1970).
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Such a proceeding allows full considerationof whether the curtailed
expression is protectedby the first amendment.7 0 A neutral judici-
ary helps adjust the contrary individual and police interests. By
providing an opportunity to examine fully the merits of a particu-
lar expression, the adversarial proceeding helps ensure that the
public right to free dissemination of ideas is not violated.7 1
Following the adversarial proceeding, a judge must make an
ultimate determination regarding the protected nature of the ex-
pressive material.7 2 This requirement is predicated on the belief
that "only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding en-
sures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression . . . to im-
pose a valid final restraint."' "7 Because of the complexities involved
in resolving the limits of protected speech, only a judge is ade-
quately equipped to make such ultimate decisions affecting
expression.74
While an adversarial proceeding must take place, the Court
has concluded that the hearing need not always occur before the
seizure of the expressive material by police authorities, but may
sometimes take place shortly afterward."* In Heller v. New York
the Court determined that a judge could issue a warrant for the
seizure of a film without first conducting an adversary hearing on
the obscenity question.76 The Court found that judicial action per-
missible because there was an opportunity for a judicial determina-
tion of obscenity in an adversary proceeding promptly following
70. See, e.g., Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51 (1965); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); see also Note, Prior adver-
sary Hearings on the Question of Obscenity, COLUM. L. REv. 1403 (1970).
71. See, e.g., Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); A Quantity of
Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); see also Note, supra note 70, at 1403.
72. See, e.g., Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); A Quantity of
Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
73. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 489 (1973); see also United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
74. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
75. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 488 (1973). The Court noted that there was no
absolute right to a prior adversary hearing applicable to all cases where arguably expressive
material is seized. Id. Where the seizure is pursuant to a warrant, the case for a prior adver-
sary hearing is particularly weak. Id.
76. The judge in Heller had previously viewed the film and found it to be obscene. Id.
at 485. Moreover, the film was not actually subjected to a final restraint, as only a copy was
temporarily detained in order to preserve it as evidence. Id. at 490.
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the seizure.7 The Court reasoned that a prompt judicial determi-
nation remained necessary, however, so that administrative delays
would not become forms of censorship.7 a
2. "Single Copy Rules"
The Heller case involved the seizure of a single copy of film
pursuant to a warrant. The Court distinguished single copy
seizures from wholesale seizures designed to destroy or block dis-
tribution or exhibition of mass quantities of expressive material,
and determined that in situations similar to Heller, the judicial de-
termination may follow the seizure because adequate protections
to safeguard first amendment interests were available.79 Because
the seizure is pursuant to a warrant, issued after a determination
of probable cause by a neutral judicial magistrate, 0 the chance of
gross abuse by police in exercising seizure powers is lessened.81
Moreover, the provision for adversarial participation in and judi-
cial determination of the obscenity issue following the seizure as-
sures the full consideration of expression in light of first amend-
ment guarantees.8s
In addition, upon a showing that other copies of the film or
similar expressive material is not available to the exhibitor, provi-
sion must be made so that continued dissemination of the material
is unimpeded pending the judicial determination.8 Thus, where
other copies of the expressive material are not available, the exhib-
77. Id. at 488.
78. Id. at 489 (citations omitted). Although the Court in HelLer refrained from defining
any rigid, specific deadlines regarding the "promptness" of the judicial determination, it did
note that by "prompt" it meant the shortest period "compatible with sound judicial resolu-
tion." Id. at 492 n.9. Following an adversary proceeding, the judicial determination in Heller
occurred within 48 days of the seizure, which was apparently "compatible with sound judi-
cial resolution" under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 490. Though 48 days from the
seizure to ultimate determination of obscenity appears rather long, there are indications
that the Court was persuaded by the lack of a practical restraint of expression in the Heler
instance and the failure of the defendant to avail himself of opportunities for expedited
judicial consideration of the obscenity issue. Id. Moreover, the 48 day period entailed the
time from initial seizure to final judicial determination. It thus included the adversarial
proceedings plus any delays attributable to the judicial process.
79. Id. at 492-93.
80. An outline of the probable cause requirement necessary to obtain a warrant is pro-
vided infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
81. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 493 (1973).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 492-93, esp. n.11.
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itor must be allowed to copy the material.84 If copying is denied,
the seized material must be returned."'
Adherence to these safeguards in the context of Single copy
seizures of expression would, the Court reasoned, protect first
amendment values from prior restraints by allowing "only a mini-
mal interference with public circulation pending litigation."'" Con-
comitantly, such procedures would also serve the "public interests
in full and fair prosecution for obscenity offenses."' 7 Implementa-
tion of the Heller procedures thus helps resolve conflicting first
amendment and police interests when expressive mate-
rial-especially material on the borderline of legitimacy-is seized.
3. "Mass Quantity Rules"
Wholesale removals of expressive materials for purposes of de-
struction or suppression as contraband require the different proce-
dural protections of the "mass quantity rules."se Where expressive
material has been removed from circulation in a wholesale manner,
the Court has determined that a judicial determination of illegiti-
macy must take place prior to any seizure to avoid abridging the
public right to free expression." A prior judicial determination is
necessary because when all copies are seized, the expression in
them is effectively suppressed.'0 Even if the material were ulti-
mately determined to be protected, the public would have been de-
prived of access to it in the interim."
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 493.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 492; see Comment, Private Search & Prior Restraint of Obscene Materials:
The Interaction of Two Doctrines, 31 MERCER L. REv. 1029 (1980). The commentators
called the different standards "single copy rules" and "mass quantity rules," terms which I
have also employed. Id. at 1032-33 n.31.
89. See, e.g., A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (seizure of 1,715 cop-
ies of 31 novels); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (seizure of approximately
11,000 copies of 280 publications).
90. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964); Marcus v. Search War-
rant, 367 U.S. 717, 736-37 (1961). In Marcus the Court commented that the ability of dis-
tributors to circulate their ideas would thus be severely curtailed, dependent on their own
integrity in acquiring or devising other copies. Id. at 736.
91. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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4. Censorship Scheme Protection8
Finally, in addition to the procedures required in police single
copy and mass quantity seizures of expression, the Court deter-
mined in Freedman v. Marylande2 that further procedural safe-
guards must apply to censorship schemes. These added protections
are necessary to obviate the dangers inherent in any censorship
system. 8 First, the censor must bear the burden of proving that
the film constitutes unprotected expression.9" Second, any require-
ment of advance submission may not "lend an effect of finality to
the censor's determination . . . ." Third, "any restraint imposed
in advance of a final judicial determination . . . must . . . be lim-
ited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period
compatible with sound judicial resolution."' Last, the procedure
must assure a prompt final judicial decision to minimize the deter-
rent effect of an interim, and possible erroneous, denial of a
license.97
5. Summary
The Heller and Freedman decisions illustrate that sensitive
procedures and practices are required to protect first amendment
interests. Freedom of expression can easily be destroyed by insen-
sitive procedures and practices used by police authorities in seizing
and judging expressive materials. The procedural protections dis-
92. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). The censorship system involved in Freedman aptly illustrates
the characteristics of such a statutory system. A film exhibitor must first submit the film to
a board of censors for approval. Upon determination that the film is not obscene, the exhibi-
tor receives a license to show it. Id. at 55.
93. The Court outlined some of the dangers inherent in a censorship system. A censor-
ship proceeding generally puts the initial burden of persuasion on the exhibitor. Moreover,
since it is the business of a censor to censor, there is always the danger that the censoring
individual or body will be less responsive to first amendment values than a court. Finally, if
the censorship system impedes opportunities f6r judicial review, there is always the danger
that the censor's decision will be final. Id. at 57-58; see also Emerson, Prior Restraints,
supra note 35, at 658-59.
94. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
95. Id. There must be assurance, by statute or "authoritative judicial construction,"
that the censor will "either issue a license or go to court to restrain the film" within a brief,
specified period. Id. at 58-59. Thus, the censor bears the burden of going to court.
96. Id.
97. Id. As a model for the incorporation of the required procedural safeguards, the
Court suggested the statute it upheld in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957);
Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60.
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cussed above were designed to prevent such destruction.
The Court's reliance on the adversary hearing requirement to
safeguard first amendment interests from unrestricted police con-
duct stems from its desire to vindicate public and individual rights
in free expression." Both individuals and society need protection
from interim government suppressions of expressive material that
ultimately may be found to be constitutionally protected. The ad-
versary hearing requirement helps safeguard against any restraint
that extends beyond the strictly temporary."a In the absence of an
adjudication of illegitimacy, any serious or long-lasting suppression
is not permitted.
Nevertheless, many courts choose not to apply the foregoing
safeguards to government searches and seizures of expressive ma-
terial obtained through private searches. 100 These courts have as-
sumed that application of these safeguards is confined to situations
factually similar to those for which the protections were formu-
lated.10' Because a private search involves fortuity and lacks the
overt participation of state authorities that police action pursuant
to a warrant or statute provides, a narrow reading of these protec-
tions would not seem to demand their application. 02 The Supreme
Court's decision in Walter did not clarify the situation, as it relied
primarily on fourth amendment principles.
98. As the cases discussed in the foregoing section indicate, only an adversary hearing
insures the necessary sensitivity to first amendment values to determine the content of
speech. Because the adversary hearing provides for the participation of the owner of the
allegedly illicit material, the presence of the party best able to argue the merits of the
targeted expression is insured.
99. For an excellent discussion of the prior adversary hearing, its origins and rationale,
see Note, supra note 70, at 1403. ("The purpose of this requirement is not so much to
supplement existing criminal procedures for protection of the individual rights of those who
distribute allegedly obscene materials as it is to protect the public from interim governmen-
tal suppression of material that may ultimately be declared to be nonobscene and, therefore,
constitutionally protected.")
100. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Sherwin, 539 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Entringer, 532 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1976).
101. See, e.g. United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Entringer, 532 F.2d 634 (8th
Cir. 1976). In Sherwin, for example, the court stated that "we do not agree that an adver-
sary hearing prior to the seizure in this case was required by the first amendment," despite
the restraint of 17 cartons of books. 539 F.2d at 8. (citation omitted).
102. See, e.g. United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Entringer, 532 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1976).
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III. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Instead of relying on the first amendment safeguards ex-
amined above, most courts evaluate government controls over ex-
pressive material obtained through private searches according to
fourth amendment dictates.10 s By relying on fourth amendment
search and seizure rules, which are designed to preserve evidence
for criminal prosecutions, 104 these courts inadequately attend to
the first amendment values implicated in police controls over ex-
pression. After reviewing fourth amendment theory, this discussion
demonstrates how application of the private search doctrine en-
dangers these first amendment values.
A. Interests Protected By The Fourth Amendment
The core value underlying the fourth amendment is the right
of an individual to be free from unwarranted government intru-
sion.106 Circumscribing all official intrusions, the fourth amend-
ment safeguards the privacy of citizens from arbitrary encroach-
ments by police or other government officials.106 Interference with
individual privacy is permissible only when police authorities act
pursuant to a warrant or a judicially created warrant exception.10 7
In the typical fourth amendment case, police officials must ob-
tain a warrant before searching or seizing property for evidentiary
purposes. A warrant may be issued only by a neutral judicial officer
and only after a determination is made that probable cause exists
to believe that the property to be searched or seized is connected
103. See; e.g., United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Sherwin, 539 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Entringer, 532 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1976).
104. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 8.
106. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
107. Warrantless searches or seizures are per se unreasonable unless justified on the
basis of certain accepted and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 5 (1977). Some of the commonly recognized warrant excep-
tions are plain-view, see, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam)
("objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence"); search incident to arrest,
see e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (after valid arrest, police may make lim-
ited search of person and area within immediate reach of arrestee); exigent circumstance,
see, e.g. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (police justified in seizing evidence without
warrant due to likelihood that evidence would otherwise be lost); and the Carrol v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) automobile exception (warrantless conduct jusitified because of
the inherent mobility of automobiles).
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with criminal wrongdoing.108 This neutral judicial determination is
necessary, the Court has reasoned, to ensure the protection of citi-
zens from unwarranted government intrusion.109
Although privacy is not mentioned anywhere in the text of the
amendment, numerous decisions have interpreted the fourth
amendment as protecting privacy values." 0 The underlying pre-
mise of the amendment is, in fact, that an individual's personal life
should not be subject to constant or arbitrary government intrus-
tion.' The amendment's proscription of warrantless searches and
seizures protects the individual's right of privacy by preventing
such intrusions."1
B. Expectation Of Privacy Test
The current test for determining whether fourth amendment
rights have been violated was developed by the Court in Katz v.
United States."8 In reasoning that the fourth amendment "pro-
108. Ex parte in nature, the warrant proceeding takes place before a magistrate. A pre-
vailing test for determining probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant is the two-
prong standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
An affidavit must set forth the "underlying circumstances" necessary to enable a judicial
officer to determine independently the validity of the affliant's conclusion that there is actu-
ally evidence of crime. Secondly, the affiant must support his claim that the informant he
relied upon was "credible" or the information supplied in the affidavit was "reliable." Id. at
114.
109. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 757-59 (1979).
110. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969) (the security of per-
sons and property); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (i968) (right of personal dignity); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 455 (1963) (dissenting opinion) (right of personal liberty); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (sanctity of home and "the indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property."); United States v. Holmes, 521
F.2d 859, 870 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part per curiam on rehearing, 537
F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (right to be let alone); Fixed v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483 (5th
Cir. 1974) (right of individuality).
111. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) where the Court stated:
The basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment as recognized in countless deci-
sions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment
thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which "is basic to a free
society."
Id. at 528 (citation omitted).
112. The individual right to privacy arises by implication of judicial interpretation of
the fourth amendment, holding that a person's daily activities are not subject to continual
or indiscriminate official scrutiny. See supra notes 109-10; see also Comment, The Concept
of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 J. LAw REF. 154 (1972).
113. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, F.B.I. agents attached an electronic listening and
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tects people, not places," the majority concluded that fourth
amendment protection would no longer "turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."'" The
Court then determined that government activities in eavesdrop-
ping and recording the defendant's conversation in a telephone
booth violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied. The
actions by government officials constituted a "search and seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment."' 5 Because the ac-
tions were unsupported by a warrant or warrantless justification,
the Court held them to be unlawful.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan stated that the new
fourth amendment rule imposed a two-fold requirement: (1) "that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy," and (2) "that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "118 Harlan's pronouncement
has been regarded as the definitive statement of the Court's "ex-
pectation of privacy" test."'
Applying the principles of Katz to containers of personal ef-
fects, the Court has more recently determined that legitimate ex-
pectations of privacy attach to the contents of packages, luggage,
and other receptacles."18 Thus when private parties open and
recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth from which the defendant placed
calls. By this apparatus the F.B.I. obtained evidence of illicit gambling activities, which they
used to convict the defendant. The Court overturned the conviction.
114. Id. at 353. The "trespass" doctrine formerly controlled the scope of fourth amend-
ment protection. The trespass doctrine predicated fourth amendment protection on the
physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area. A constitutionally protected area
was a conclusory label used by the Court to designate areas to which fourth amendment
protection was extended. In the absence of any physical penetration, there was no fourth
amendment search and seizure violation. Id. It was thus possible to eavesdrop, electronically
or otherwise, in traditionally protected area and avoid constitutional infirmity so long as no
trespass was committed. Also known as the "constitutionally protected area" doctrine, the
trespass doctrine was primarily developed in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)
and Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928).
115. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 237, 353 (1967).
116. Id. at 261.
117. For excellent discussions of the Katz expectation of privacy test, see Comment, A
Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REv. 154 (1977) (In-
dividuals should be entitled to a set of reasonable privacy expectations from government
intrusions. These privacy expectations should be based on certain core property values, such
as the home.); see also Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass and Fourth Amend-
ment Protection After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 709 (1977).
118. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court found that a legitimate
expectation of privacy attached to the contents of a footlocker. By placing personal effects
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search packages that are lost, mishandled or otherwise incorrectly
delivered, the interests of absent package owners should still be
subject to fourth amendment protections. Many courts, however,
reason that in such situations the private search doctrine obviates
the need to comport with the fourth amendment.1' 9
C. Private Search Doctrine
Originating in the landmark case of Burdeau v. McDowell,120
the private search doctrine holds that searches initiated by private
citizens are beyond the scope of fourth amendment protection. 12'
inside a footlocker, the Court reasoned, defendants "manifested an expectation that the
contents would remain free from public examination." Id. at 11. Therefore, a government
search of the footlocker was unreasonable in the absence of a warrant or warrantless justifi-
cation. Id. The Court fixed the point of the warrant clause's applicability at the time when
police established exclusive control over the property. Id. at 15.
Continuing the trend begun in Chadwick, the Court held in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979), that fourth amendment protection extended to the contents of personal
luggage. By finding an expectation of privacy in the contents of a small, unlocked suitcase,
the Court arguably broadened the Chadwick scope of fourth amendment protection to vari-
ous kinds of containers. Because of Sanders, a container need not be locked or uncommonly
large to receive fourth amendment protection from unreasonable, warrantless searches of its
contents. Id. at 762 n.9.
The rationale of Chadwick and Sanders indicates that possessors of packages possess
legitimate expectations of privacy in the contents of their packages. By placing contents in
packages, which are frequently securely wrapped, the owners have manifested an expecta-
tion that the contents of their packages will remain private and free from unwarranted in-
trusion. Although an examination of package contents by private parties would be valid, a
subsequent search by police authorities should still be subject to fourth amendment protec-
tion. As in Chadwick and Sanders, any warrantless police search of packages should thus be
unconstitutional.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1980).
120. 256 U.S. 465 (1921). In Burdeau, the Supreme Court was first faced with the prob-
lem of reconciling a private search with the fourth amendment. Confronted with the issue of
whether items stolen by private detectives could be used against their owner in a criminal
proceeding, the Court fashioned the private search doctrine:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and
seizures, and. . . its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of
sovereign authority . ...
The papers having come into the possession of the government without a viola-
tion of petitioner's rights by governmental authority, we see no reason why the
fact that individual, unconnected with the government, may have wrongfully
taken them, should prevent them from being held for use in prosecuting an
offense where the documents are of an incriminatory character.
Id. at 475-76. The private search doctrine is also commonly referred to as the Burdeau rule.
121. For an excellent discussion of the private search doctrine, see Note, Private
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Government authorities may lawfully take possession of the pri-
vately seized property, as they did not participate in the initial
search or seizure.12 2 Having lawfully acquired the property, they
are free to use it as evidence in a criminal prosecution. 123
In Walter the Supreme Court indicated a desire to limit the
scope of the private search doctrine,2 4 but did not delineate the
parameters beyond which police agents may not legally proceed. 25
Searches and Seizures: United States v. Kelly and United States v. Sherwin, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 463 (1976), wherein the commentator argues that the applicability of the Burdeau rule
should be limited, ceasing to have effect when the government takes possession of privately
seized material. See also Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 1039 (1971); Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the
Future, 53 VA. L. REV. 1314, 1323-24, 1336-59 (1969); Note, Seizures by Private Parties:
Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REV. 608 (1967).
122. See, e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 574 F.2d 1224, 1225 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979): "the initial search by the airline employee, a private person,
was clearly outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Since the airline then volunta-
rily notified the authorities and turned the briefcase over to them the Government's action
did not constitute a separate search or seizure." See also United States v. DeBarry, 487 F.2d
448, 450-51 (2nd Cir. 1973); United States v. Blanton, 479 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1973); Clayton
v. United States, 413 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1969).
123. Three separate events occur in the typical private search: (1) a private search, (2) a
private seizure, and (3) government acquisition of the privately seized material. Although it
is undisputed that the first two events do not implicate the fourth amendment, the transfer
from private to official custody tests the limits of the fourth amendment proscription of
unwarranted government intrusion into individual privacy. Indeed, many courts view gov-
ernment acquisitions of privately seized material as beyond fourth amendment strictures.
See, e.g., United States v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. McDaniel,
574 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978). Individuals who fortuitously lose property through private
searches may thus have no protection against discovery of their property contents. There-
fore, notwithstanding official intrusions into their private property, such individuals are con-
stitutionally powerless to challenge the seizure of their property.
124. The plurality decision in Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), is unlikely
to curb the propensity of some courts to validate private to official transfers of property. By
failing to reach a consensus in defining the limits of the private search doctrine, the plural-
ity's pronouncements in Walter that lawful government possession of boxes of film did not
sanction a warrantless search of their contents, Id. at 654-55, will not protect the rights of
individual possessors of privately seized property. Indeed, the position of the four member
dissenting group in Walter serves to encourage the continued tolerance of property transfers
from the private to official hands:
The Court at least preserves the integrity of the rule specifically recognized
long ago in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). That rule is to the
effect that the Fourth Amendment proscribes only governmental action, and
does not apply to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a
private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the partic-
ipation or knowledge of any government official.
Id. at 662.
125. The Court has had many opportunities, previous to Walter v. United States, 447
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Until precise boundaries are established, the federal circuits will
continue to differ in their perception of the type of police conduct
which triggers application of fourth amendment protections."" In
many cases police will continue to receive and hold private prop-
erty, including expressive materials, free from judicial scrutiny."'
D. The Abridgement Of Freedom Of Expression
Through The Private Search Doctrine
When government authorities accept presumptively protected
expressive material from private parties, police officials may easily
effect a prior restraint of expression. Because the transfer of con-
trol from private to official hands occurs surreptitiously, police offi-
cials may dispense with satisfying the judicial scrutiny and other
warrant requirements necessary in the more typical police search
U.S. 649 (1980), in which to resolve the problems represented by the private search doctrine.
Some of these opportunities have included United States v. McDaniel, 574 F.2d 1224 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979) (airline employee opened defendant's unmarked
briefcase and discovered firearm, and then "voluntarily" turned briefcase over to authori-
ties); United States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975)
(suspicious freight agent in California, opened trunk and discovered marijuana and then
contacted government agents, who subsequently searched the trunks while arresting defen-
dants in Wisconsin); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1127 (1975) (air carrier examined boxes and found arguably obscene films in San Fran-
cisco, and then relayed information to government authorities who seized films without an
adversary hearing upon their arrival in Washington, D.C.).
126. The contrast between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in their treatment of the pri-
vate search doctrine best highlights the differing approaches of the circuits. In United
States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1976), the Eighth Circuit viewed a government ac-
quisition of defendant's books from a common carrier as a seizure subject to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement. Because the government did not obtain a warrant prior to
seizing the books, the court found a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976)
(en banc) determined that a government acquisition of defendant's expressive materials
from a shipper was not a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, since the
property was "voluntarily relinquished to the government by private citizens." Id. at 8. All
subsequent police conduct was therefore viewed as being outside the scope df fourth amend-
ment protection and thus valid. For further examination of these two cases and their differ-
ence in approach to seizures of first amendment material see HARVARD Note, supra note
121.
127. For an example of the type of conduct police have engaged in due to the absence
of any bright-line prohibitive rule limiting the private search doctrine, see United States v.
Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1976) (over a four month period, F.B.I. agents took copies of
allegedly obscene books without notifying the owner or obtaining a warrant); see also supra
note 126.
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or seizure."" By holding presumptively protected materials with-
out notifying the dispossessed owners or judicial officers, govern-
ment authorities commit a second prior restraint.'29 Similarly, po-
lice officials impose prior restraints when they hold expressive
material before judicial proceedings and make the owner initiate
action to regain possession. 30
By allowing police authorities to seize expressive material on
the assumption it will be declared illicit, the private search doc-
trine poses a grave threat to first amendment rights. Long intervals
often occur between government acquisitions of expressive mate-
rial and the ultimate determination of its protected content. " In
the Walter case, for example, government authorities held expres-
sive material for some sixteen months before the ultimate hearing
occurred. 3 2 Any such lengthy restraint of expression significantly
abridges first amendment rights by restricting public access to pre-
sumptively protected material.
Moreover, private searches often result in restraining large
volumes of expressive material. 3 In Walter, for example, twenty-
five different films and 871 copies of those films were detained."'
Despite the Supreme Court's safeguards governing mass quantity
seizures, " courts nonetheless sanction government receipts of
large volumes of expressive material when procured through a pri-
vate search. "'
Most importantly, however, the private search doctrine allows
police authorities to make the initial decision of whether to accept
128. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text for discussion of the warrant
procedure.
129. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. The failure to notify opposing par-
ties and to give them opportunities to participate in decisions affecting their ideas has been
noted by the Supreme Court to be a basic constitutional infirmity. See Carrol v. Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 174, 180 (1968).
130. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (16 month
delay from seizure to adversary hearing); Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967)
(at least one year delay from seizure to trial).
132. This fact appears in the lower court decision. United States v. Sanders, 592 F.2d
788, 797 (5th Cir. 1979) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978) (six cartons of film);
United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (17 cartons of expressive
material); United States v. Entringer, 532 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1976) (114 reels of film).
134. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 n.6 (1980).
135. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 133..
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or hold expressive material. Because police officials are incapable
of evaluating the protected nature of expression,' police acquisi-
tion of privately seized expressive material tends to allow espe-
cially indiscriminate controls. Of the twenty-five titles seized by
police in Walter, only five were ultimately declared unprotected
and used in the criminal prosecution. 38 Similarly, indiscriminate
and overly broad restraints of expression are likely to occur when-
ever the private search doctrine is applied.
Yet despite significant criticism, 3 9 the private search doctrine
is very much alive. 40 The continued tolerance of such unbridled
police conduct can only have an acutely chilling effect on the indi-
vidual exercise of and the public right to freedom of expression.' 4'
IV. A SUGGESTED MODEL
Because of the significance and fragility of first amendment
rights, freedom of expression must be vigilantly guarded. 42 To do
so, effective procedural safeguards must be promulgated and vigor-
ously enforced. Yet when police authorities obtain presumptively
protected expressive material through private searches, there are
currently no mandated procedural safeguards with which authori-
ties must comply. It is apparent that where police officials discover
a first amendment interest in seized property, the safeguards de-
veloped by the Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland 43 should
apply to protect first amendment rights from the dangers now
posed by the private search doctrine.
When private citizens transfer control over expressive materi-
137. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
138. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 652 (1980).
139. See HARVARD Note, supra note 121. The commentators argue that the private
search doctrine incorrectly casts police in the role of passive receivers of evidence, and tends
to absolve them of any fourth amendment responsibility. Furthermore, little consideration,
if any, is accorded "the interests or rights of absent third parties against whom the evidence
is used." Id. at 467; see also Comment, supra note 88 (Burdeau rule should not have exten-
sive application in the first amendment arena).
140. The position of the four member dissent in Walter, which favors the continued
implementation of the private search doctrine, should especially be noted. See supra note
124 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
142. "[C]easeless vigilance is the watchword to prevent . . . erosion (of first amend-
ment rights) by Congress or by the States." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563 (1969)
citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957).
143. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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als to police authorities, the government can reasonably be ex-
pected to be aware of a first amendment interest in the seized
property. "4 Upon discovery that such an interest is at stake, the
government must comply with the first amendment procedural
safeguards developed by the Supreme Court in the context of cen-
sorship systems and warrant-authorized police action. "1 5 As yet,
the Supreme Court has shown no willingness to mandate applica-
tion of these safeguards to government controls of expressive mate-
rial obtained through private searches. However, these safeguards
are essential to sustain first amendment interests and to protect
expressive material from prior restraint.""
Fortunately, useful models for applying procedural protections
are available. The Supreme Court determined in Blount v. Rizzi
147
that the set of protections developed in Freedman v. Maryland
must be applied when postal workers inadvertently discovered po-
tentially obscene or otherwise seemingly illicit expressive materi-
als. Likewise, the Court determined in United States v. Thirty-
seven Photographs14 8 that the Freedman protections must be ap-
plied when customs officials fortuitously discovered similar expres-
sive materials.
In both Blount and Thirty-seven Photographs the Court rea-
soned that the Freedman protections were necessary to safeguard
first amendment interests from the dangers of an administrative
censorship system.14 9 The Court thus reaffirmed its conviction, ex-
pressed in Freedman, that a system of prior restraints violates the
first amendment if it lacks certain safeguards.150 Indeed, "the First
Amendment requires that procedures be incorporated that 'ensure
144. In most private searches, the private party informs government officials regarding
the nature of the property discovered. The government should thus be aware that it will
receive expressive materials. In Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 652 (1980), for exam-
ple, the private parties called the F.B.I., informing the government of the films. See also
United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Sherwin, 539
F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc); United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365, 1368 (8th Cir.
1976).
145. See supra notes 67-99 and accompanying text.
146. Prior restraints increase the likelihood of censorship. See supra notes 53-66, 128-
141 and accompanying text.
147. 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
148. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
149. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416-22 (1971); United States v. Thirty-seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363, 367-75 (1971).
150. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
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against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression,
which is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncer-
tain line.' "151
In Freedman the Court held "that, because only a judicial de-
termination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sen-
sitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judi-
cial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint." 5 The
Court further held that to ensure a prompt judicial determination,
so that administrative delays would not in themselves become a
form of censorship, several additional steps were necessary. Specif-
ically, (1) there must be assurance that the censor will either seek
judicial review of or license the expression within a specified, brief
period, (2) "[ajny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial
determination on the merits must . . . be limited to preservation
of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with
sound judicial resolution," and (3) "the procedure must. . . assure
a prompt final judicial decision" to minimize the impact of possi-
ble erroneous action. 5 3 1 :
The logic of Freedman applies with equal, if not greater, force
to police receipts of expressive material obtained through private
searches. Even though most private searches do not involve formal
statutes authorizing censorship as in the postal and customs set-
tings, the conduct of government officials in seizing and maintain-
ing control over expressive material obtained through private
searches constitutes another form of equally pernicious and perva-
sive censorship.
As with postal and customs searches, police discovery of ex-
pressive materials obtained in private searches is fortuitous and
poses grave threats to freedom of expression. Such discovery, like
customs searches, serves to restrain expressive material for sus-
tained periods of time. 54 Police authorities, like postal and cus-
toms officials, are incapable of correctly evaluating the nature of
expressive material; they are equally likely to impose indiscrimi-
151. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. at 416 (citation omitted).
152. 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
153. Id. at 58-59.
154. Regarding customs searches, the Court noted in United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 371-72 (1971), that "[our researches have disclosed cases sanc-
tioning delays of as long as 40 days and even six months between seizure of obscene goods
and commencement of judicial proceedings." Id. (citations omitted).
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nate and overly broad restraints. Wrongly delivered or handled
packages merit the same constitutional protection accorded mate-
rial seized by postal and customs officials.
Application of the Freedman protections to privately searched
and seized expressive materials would safeguard first amendment
rights more effectively than resort to the "single copy" and "mass
quantity" rules developed by the Court in Helter v. New York and
Marcus v. Search Warrant, respectively. 55 In the typical private
search, police authorities acquire possession of property directly
from private parties and before any involvement of the judiciary.
Because police already have control of the expressive material,
there appears to be little logic in applying the Marcus "mass quan-
tity" rule that requires a judicial determination prior to any
seizure of expressive matter. Likewise, the major provision of the
Helter "single copy" rule, the prompt adversary hearing, is in-
cluded among the more extensive Freedman protections. The Hel-
ler and Marcus protections are designed primarily to control police
discretion in seizing expressive material. In Freedman, the protec-
tions serve to limit the acts of government officials who already
exercise control over the expressive material-precisely the situa-
tion resulting from the typical private search.Application of the Freedman protections to expressive mate-
rial acquired by government officials through private searches
would require police authorities to notify the judiciary when po-
tentially obscene or illicit material is obtained or to release it. 56
Upon notifying judicial officials, police would have to transfer the
material to the more neutral judiciary. After such transfer, any re-
straint placed on the material before a final judicial determination
would be limited to preserving the status quo' 57 and the discretion
of government authorities would be significantly curtailed. Lastly,
there must be a prompt, final judicial determination. In Thirty-
seven Photographs, the Supreme Court construed the statute to
require intervals of no more than fourteen days from seizure of the
property to initiation of judicial proceeding and no more than 60
days from the filing of the action to final determination by the
court. 8 Similarly brief, or briefer, intervals should apply in the
155. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
156. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
157. Id. at 58-59.
158. 402 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1971).
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case of private searches."'
Application of the Freedman protections to private searches
would satisfy several of the needs of a free society. Prompt adver-
sarial hearings and prompt judicial determination of first amend-
ment content obviate the dangers of censorship imposed by un-
restricted police discretion and thus insure the integrity of the first
amendment.
Conclusion
This article has described some of the dangers to freedom of
expression posed by the Supreme Court's current treatment of po-
lice receipt of privately seized expressive material. Police removal
of presumptively protected material from circulation without noti-
fying the dispossessed owners or the judiciary constitutes a prior
restraint. Because police authorities may effect this restraint with-
out resort to minimal procedural protections, severe and long-last-
ing forms of censorship may be imposed. Current interpretations
of the private search doctrine which permit these practices serve to
chill individual and societal interests in freedom of expression.
The article has argued that the aforementioned dangers have
resulted from the Court's misguided reliance on the fourth amend-
ment and from failure to promulgate a comprehensive set of stan-
dards to govern fortuitous government acquisitions of expressive
material. To safeguard first amendment rights, this article has sug-
gested a model to limit police control over expressive matter. The
suggested model provides a satisfactory means of resolving the
conflict among individual, police and first amendment interests.
159. The 48 day period from seizure to judicial determination in Heller v. New York,
413 U.S. 483, 490 (1973) is certainly a more reasonable time frame than the similar 60 day
period in United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs 402 U.S. 367, 367-75 (1971). The
briefer the time span between seizure and final judicial determination provides, of course,
for a lesser interim abridgement of expression. Certainly the briefest possible restraint is the
optimal result.
With regard to the interval from seizure to initiation of judicial proceedings on the
protectedness question, the 14 day period in Thirty-Seven Photographs also seems some-
what excessive. A one week limit would be far more desirable.
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